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Anti-competitive practices, unlevel playing field after the full opening 
of the postal market 
PÁL VALENTINY 
The experiences of full market opening of network services have so far 
shown an increasing role of competition regulation. The new entrants, 
trusting in the prohibition of competition restrictions, are trying to compete 
with incumbent service providers. On the field of postal services as a 
network service, however, the traditional form of regulation is sectoral 
regulation. The effective cooperation of the two regulatory regimes is 
especially important in order to evaluate state aid in line with EU 
principles. In the course of the regulation both the universal service 
provider’s financial balance and the gains expected from increased 
competition must be secured at the same time. The third postal directive 
restricted the possibility of sectoral regulatory intervention to ensure a 
universal service, at the same time providing a wider decision-making 
authority to the regulators in this respect. 
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 This article will provide an overview of restrictive effect of the incumbent 
service providers’ market conduct and business strategy on competition, 
and the possible market distortion effect of state aid. In the first part we will 
cover the problems arising from the regulatory framework of the third 
postal directive, the questions that have been left open, and the 
controversies between postal regulation and other regulatory fields. The 
second part will give an account of the most common restrictions of 
competition in postal services. Following this, the third and fourth parts will 
touch on the questions of state aid and mergers in the postal sector, lastly 
we will describe the main characteristics of Hungarian competition law 
cases. 
Incumbents and third postal directive 
Postal services are one of the most recently liberalised markets where most 
incumbents are state monopolies that have been able to keep most parts of 
their traditional markets even after the partial market opening, and in most 
places their market share has only been reduced slightly. The third postal 
directive (2008/6/EC),1 as the final element of the postal regulatory process 
started in 1997, aimed at full postal market opening by 2010 (in some 
countries 2012). 2  The protective measures on the market of individual 
services have disappeared, nevertheless, the directive tended towards 
counterbalancing the additional burdens of universal service providers. The 
freedom of pricing has increased, the obligation to use uniform prices has 
been restricted, and the possible scope of universal services has been better 
defined. Additionally to the economic regulation of the sector, which was 
                                                          
1 The first directive was published in 1997 (97/67/EC), while the second in 2002 
(2002/39/EC). 
2 For the analysis of the market opening, see Miklós Károly Kiss [2013]. 
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mostly limited to the scope of universal services, competition policy has 
come to play a greater role. 
Pricing issues 
Section 38 of the directive defines the major goals in relation to pricing: “In 
a fully competitive environment, it is important, both for the financial 
equilibrium of the universal service as well as for limiting market 
distortions, that the principle that prices reflect normal commercial 
conditions and costs is only departed from in order to protect public 
interests. This objective should be achieved by continuing to allow Member 
States to maintain uniform tariffs for single piece tariff mail, the service 
most frequently used by consumers, including small and medium-sized 
enterprises.” In connection with this, the directive states regarding the 
amendment of the previous Article 12 that “prices shall be affordable and 
must be such that all users, independent of geographical location, and, in 
the light of specific national conditions, have access to the services 
provided”. The directive defines neither the term affordable, nor the 
principles of how to measure it. The basic requirements of cost-calculations 
are, nonetheless, incorporated in the directive. Conforming with these 
requirements and with the criteria of affordability, the pricing of service 
providers can be considered free. 
Access at the downstream market 
The directive does not prescribe that market participants in the downstream 
market should have access to certain elements of the postal infrastructure, 
but it merely creates this possibility. It holds (Section 5 Article 12) that if 
such access was established, then “the tariffs, together with the associated 
conditions, shall apply equally both as between different third parties and as 
between third parties and universal service providers supplying equivalent 
 services.” Under the directive, a greater flexibility at setting the tariffs may 
be provided, and according to Section 39 “…Tariffs should take account of 
the avoided costs, as compared to the standard service covering the 
complete range of features offered for the clearance, sorting, transport and 
distribution of individual postal items”. In those countries that statutorily 
allowed for access to the downstream market, this led to pricing based on 
avoided (foregone) costs almost everywhere (Ecorys, 2008, p. 69). 
In relation to the setting of access tariffs for the downstream market, the 
most common restrictions on competition due to the vertical structure may 
be the application of the later detailed price squeeze.3 The evaluation of 
price-setting is possible in 8 countries in advance, in 6 countries afterwards, 
and in 4 countries at both times (ERGP, 2012a, p. 44). By allowing for 
flexibility in price-setting, the directive gave way rather to the 
predominance of competition law, especially considering that price squeeze 
tests had first been established in competition law – among others by 
applying them to postal services. 
The scope of universal services and its unfair financial burdens 
One of the most important questions in terms of regulation is the definition 
of the scope of universal services.4 Knowing this, it is possible to enforce 
                                                          
3 Under this, we understand the reduction of the margin between wholesale and retail 
prices in a way that is restrictive of competition. 
4 The fulfilment of the universal postal service requirement is a state responsibility, 
which is ensured by the state through the universal service provider. In the European 
Union, it is in the authority of the Member States to designate a universal service  
provider, in order to fulfil the universal postal service requirement. Universal services 
may also be provided by not designated service providers. In Hungary, the Magyar 
 5 
 
the requirements of affordability and cost-based tariffs against the universal 
service providers, additionally to prescribe service-quality and performance 
standards for those providing similar services, and to determine the 
additional burdens of universal service providers. At the beginning, an 
exhaustive definition of universal services was common in most countries, 
which provided a strong regulatory potential for the regulatory authorities 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2010, p. 126). In the course of the market 
opening, however, the scope of universal services has started to be reduced. 
The most recent report shows that in the European Economic Area only 8 
countries, with a share of 9 percent of the total mail market, list all services 
beyond express services in the scope of universal services, while in 11 
countries accounting for 56 percent of the total mail market, only single 
piece items are considered to be a universal service. (See Figure 1.) 
The minimum scope of universal services was defined by the first postal 
directive (Article 3, 1997/67/EC), at the same time also determining those 
basic requirements under which the services must be carried out (Article 5). 
The third postal directive then declared that “Obligations and requirements 
(…) may only be imposed on designated universal service providers” 
(Article 9). If there are more designated universal service providers, then 
neither services nor the areas of these services can be overlapping. The 
third directive stipulated that the universal service providers that are not 
designated but provide services constituting universal service activity, could 
be imposed on with requirements of quality, availability and performance of 
the relevant services. The content of the licences issued in relation, along 
                                                                                                                                                  
Posta Zrt. has been designated to provide this state task until 31 December 2020 
according to the CLIX. Act of 2012 on the postal services.  
 with the scope of service requirements and the question of possible 
financial contribution to comply with the universal service are all dependent 
on regulatory intervention. 
Not designated service providers, providing services which fall within the 
scope of the universal service, may be obliged to contribute to the net costs 
of sustaining universal services. In the case of mandating service-quality 
and performance requirements, however, the service providers could not be 
obliged to make financial contributions (Section 33, 2008/6/EC). For the 
compensation of the unfair burdens of the universal service obligation the 
third directive offers different options. The form of this could be “public 
compensation and cost sharing between service providers and/or users in a 
transparent manner by means of contributions to a compensation fund”, but 
there is also the possibility that profits accruing from other activities of the 
universal service provider outside the scope of the universal service are to 
be assigned, in whole or in part, to the financing of the net costs of the 
universal service (Section 26, 2008/6/EC). 
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Figure 1 
The scope of universal services in the European Economic Area  
 
All services 
BE, IE, LU, MT, RO, SK 
9% 
 
 
Single piece and bulk letters, 
direct mail or  
bulk postal parcels 
 EI, ES, FR, PT, AT 
27% 
 
Single piece 
BG, CZ, DE, EE, FI, HR, 
LT, NL, PL, SE, SI, UK 
56%
Single piece and bulk letters 
CY, HU, IT, LV, IS, NO 
8% 
 
Note: The country abbreviations are the following: AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, BG – 
Bulgaria, CH – Switzerland, CY – Cyprus, CZ – Czech Republic, DK – Denmark, DE – 
Germany, EE – Estonia, IE – Ireland, EL – Greece, ES – Spain, FI – Finland, FR – 
France, HU – Hungary, IS – Iceland, IT – Italy, LI – Liechtenstein, LT – Lithuania, LU 
– Luxembourg, LV– Latvia, MT – Malta, NL – Netherlands, NO – Norway, PL – Poland, 
PT – Portugal, RO– Romania, SI – Slovenia, SK – Slovakia, SE – Sweden, UK – United 
Kingdom. 
Source: WIK [2013], p. 130. 
In order to calculate the net costs, universal service providers shall keep 
separate accounts in their internal accounting system for the services that 
constitute universal service to differentiate them from the other services and 
products. The proper accounting separation may also be imposed by 
Member States on postal service providers who have to contribute to the 
compensation fund. The principles of net cost calculation are incorporated 
in Article 14 amended by the third directive, while the European Regulators 
Group for Postal Services (ERGP) provides regular assistance in the 
 execution of cost-calculations and the interpretation of cost-categories 
(ERGP, 2012b, 2013). 
The relationship of regulation and competition policy in postal services 
The first directive contained provisions on the designation of the legally 
and functionally independent national regulatory authorities. The national 
regulatory authorities may also be entrusted with the enforcement of 
competition rules in the postal sector. Even though the mission statements 
of numerous regulatory authorities contain the task of strengthening 
competition, most of the authorities believe that the primary enforcer of 
competition rules is the national competition authority. According to a 2009 
survey of WIK, 22 countries, representing the 77 percent of the EU/EEA 
market, stated that in the supervision of the conditions of competition the 
primary organisation is the competition authority (WIK, 2009, p. 242). Ten 
Member States held that national regulatory authorities have a secondary 
supervisory role in the enforcement of competition rules. 
The completion of market opening in network services proved that the role 
of competition rules will increase following a full market opening. The new 
entrants of the market by using the prohibition on restrictions of 
competition attempt to avert the market-protection steps of the incumbent 
service providers. By providing exclusive authority to regulate competition 
to the sectoral regulatory authorities, the chance the capture of the authority 
– well-known in the literature – would increase. The application of the rules 
of state aid for postal services is a very common case. The resolution of the 
European Commission (hereinafter: Commission) is needed for most of the 
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questions regarding compensation. Although since the Altmark case5 state 
aid allocated for services of general economic interest6 is easier to assess, 
the actual application requires complex cost-calculations. Cost-calculations 
are mostly supervised by the national regulatory authorities, and when the 
four conditions established by the Altmark case are not fulfilled, the 
compensation may constitute a state aid that must be examined by the 
Commission. If the compensation is too high, the aid may be considered 
illegal. For this reason, the coordination between regulatory and 
competition authorities is crucial, since in course of the regulation both the 
financial balance of the designated universal service providers and the 
realisation of benefits from the increased competition must be ensured. Due 
to this, the third postal directive has limited the intervention of the sectoral 
regulators to the level necessary for ensuring universal service, however, at 
                                                          
5 Based on the judicial stand in the Altmark case: (1) the recipient undertaking must 
actually have public service obligations to discharge, and the obligations must be 
clearly defined, (2) the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is 
calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, (3) 
the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of 
the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means 
of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would 
have incurred in discharging those obligations, (4) the compensation cannot exceed 
what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public 
service obligations, (Altmark, 2003, pp. I–7847–7848). 
6 The services of general economic interest mostly consist of public services provided 
on market basis. These services are under the scope of public service  obligations, for 
example these are the services of the energy sector, or the transport or 
telecommunications services. 
 the same time it provided greater authority in this realm (Eccles, 2010, pp. 
49–52). 
One of the most important measures of the postal regulatory authority is the 
determination of prices or the approval thereof. This becomes especially 
essential in the question of access, as for example the access fees to the post 
offices managed by the incumbent. In some countries the authority has 
recently introduced – for example the Dutch authority (Eccles, 2014, p. 
183) – the investigation of companies with significant economic power, 
based on the example of electronic info-communication.7 The background 
of this was the swift change on the Dutch postal market, when the number 
of national service providers was reduced from four to two between 2010 
and 2013. The intent was the ex ante elimination of the potential restrictions 
of competition. The investigation is still in progress whether this change 
complies with the European regulatory provisions, considering that the 
Dutch competition and sectoral regulatory authorities have been merged 
into one organisation in 2014. 
The distortions caused by value added taxes and customs 
Traditionally, Member States exempt state service providers from the scope 
of value added taxes (VAT) for the whole or a part of the postal services, 
while private service providers are obliged to levy value added tax for the 
same service. The ERGP [2012c] has also examined the market distortion 
effects, also assessing the distortions between Member States. Under the 
                                                          
7 The term significant market power (SMP) is used in sectoral regulation. If the regulator 
finds on the investigated market that the competition is not efficient enough, it can 
prescribe obligations for the service providers with significant market power to strengthen 
competition, based on the analysis of the market structure and the behaviour of service 
providers. 
 11 
 
summery of WIK [2013], three Member States do not provide any kind of 
exemption for postal services, while six Member States apply it for all types 
of services. In total, ten Member States apply reduced value added tax to a 
wider scope than universal services (the percentage data means the ratio of 
the given group in the mail market turnover). (See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2 
Value added tax exemption of universal service in the European 
Economic Area 
 
Single piece and bulk letters, direct mail  
or bulk postal parcels 
CY, FR, EI, LT, LV, MT, PL, PT, UK 
44% 
 
 
 
 
 
Single piece 
and bulk letter 
DK, ES, SI 
7% 
 
All services 
AT, BE, EL, HU, LU, SK 
9% 
No exemption 
SE, IS, NO 
5% 
 
Single piece 
BG, CZ, DE, EE, FI, IT, NL, RO 
35% 
Note: For the country abbreviations see Figure 1. 
Source: WIK [2013], p. 62. 
Another study, the analysis of the Copenhagen Economics, evaluated the 
supplier side of postal service and showed that in countries without value 
added tax exemptions it is worth to outsource most of these activities, while 
in countries with reductions the service provider is interested in keeping as 
 much portion of these activities within the company as possible 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2013, p. 174). The study analysed the economic 
effects of VAT reductions for a wide range of public utilities (waste 
management, sewage treatment, education, cultural services, hospitals, 
broadcasting and postal services). Based on their model-calculations, they 
concluded that the abolishment of the VAT reductions for these public 
services would result in a profit equivalent to the 0.34 percent of EU GDP 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2013, p. 12). The question of value added tax 
reductions has been long debated among EU decision-makers, in regard of 
the postal services the 2009 decision of the European Court of Justice has 
not changed the status quo.8 
The custom rates applicable to postal services are mostly regulated by the 
agreements of the Universal Postal Union (UPU). These entitle the 
universal service providers to exceptional rights in the custom clearance of 
incoming mails. A WIK survey (2013, p. 65) makes it apparent that the 
preferential options do not only apply to the services within the scope of 
universal service. As a consequence, all Member States have exempted their 
universal service provider from the obligations provided by custom 
regulations, at the same time not providing the same preferential treatment 
to other market actors, competing service providers. 
The regulation of international postal services 
Additionally to EU directives, international postal services are regulated by 
the UPU, as an international organisation of the United Nations. These rules 
touch on the scope of universal services, the requirements of service-
quality, and among others those terminal dues, which are imposed by the 
                                                          
8 C-357/07, TNT Post UK Ltd. See http://curia.europa.eu 
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incumbent and mostly state-owned postal services on each other. The 
principles, on which the UPU rules are based, are largely different from the 
principles of the EU. More than half of the postal regulatory authorities of 
the EU Member States assumed that they would be unable to apply the 
postal directive, or would be uncertain how to apply it, if it contradicts an 
UPU rule. Only 10 smaller Member State argued that they consider the 
directive to be the relevant law for all international postal service activities 
WIK (2013, p. 92). The directive requires cost-orientation, transparency and 
non-discrimination in terms of prices. The national regulatory authorities do 
not ensure that the terminal dues of universal services reflect these 
principles. The terminal dues determined by UPU do not correspond with 
either the actual cost, or the national postal price-determinations. Such a 
determination of terminal dues in the EU legal system is close to being 
price-fixing as a conduct restricting competition, and the incumbents 
applying these may be accused of abuse of dominant position.9 
In this situation, it seems that some Member States and authorities alone are 
not enough to enforce the EU directives, so a more active role would be 
needed from the EU institutions. Since the 1998 Communication of the 
Commission (Communication, 1998b), two new postal directives have been 
adopted and the Commission and the Court have declared their position in 
more than one questions relating to international postal services. The 
incorporation of these and their harmonisation with the UPU provisions 
would require new initiatives from the EU institutions and the renewal of 
the communication. The authors of the WIK [2013] study would require 
even further steps: they recommend an EU consultation regarding terminal 
                                                          
9 For an analysis of the cases, see WIK [2013], pp. 114–126. 
 dues and the assessment of the situation, and they urge for a united EU 
approach for the next UPU Congress (2016) and for the next rounds of 
negotiations of the international trade agreements (WIK, 2013, p. 342). 
Restrictions of competition in postal services 
The most commonly appearing restriction of competition in postal services 
is the abuse of dominance. The decisions reached in these cases were aided 
by the Commission Communication published in 2009.10 Such behaviour 
may be observed at predatory pricing, at the refusal of supply, at margin 
squeeze11 and at price reductions, which we will discuss in detail later on. 
Bundling and tying, however, is rare in postal services, between 2007 and 
2013 only one national authority (Dutch) dealt with such questions.12 
Predatory pricing 
The treatment and review practice of predatory pricing – such pricing by 
which an at least similarly efficient competitor may be excluded from the 
market – has recently been gradually changing. This is also reflected by the 
1998 Notice of the Commission (Notice, 1998a). The Notice deals with the 
application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, however, it is considered to be applicable to a 
wide range of network services. The Notice attended the questions of cost-
                                                          
10 On the expectable effects of the Communication [2009], see the analysis of Geradin–
Henry [2010]. 
11 For a more exhaustive and detailed analysis of these conducts, see Valentiny [2004], 
Valentiny–Kiss [2009]. 
12 In the field of postal services, the De Post-La Poste case was the first, in which the 
Commission held that the incumbent abused its dominant position by providing a price 
reduction for mail services only attached to a new business-to-business (B2B) service. The 
Commission considered this to be a very serious violation of rights, which must have 
strengthened its deterrent effects. (De Post-La Poste, 2002, Section 86.) 
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calculation methodology in detail. In the Notice, the Commission argued 
that cost-calculation based on the incremental costs may be the calculation 
base for the lower threshold of predatory pricing. Nonetheless, it was also 
stated that the direct introduction of incremental costs would lead to a very 
low price floor in network services, which function with a much higher 
common cost-ratio compared to other industries. 
This principle was further developed by the Commission by analysing 
multi-product companies, such as postal services. In the 2001 Deutsche 
Post case (Deutsche Post, 2001), it held that predatory pricing occurred in 
relation to the cross-financing of reserved services 13  and competing 
services. In order for a company to avoid being accused with predatory 
pricing, it must show such the earnings of its specific competing service 
could cover the average incremental cost of providing the service. In 
contrast, between 1990 and 1995 the earnings for the examined services 
were below this, thus the services were constantly loss-making. The 
earnings were not even enough to cover the network capacity costs of the 
services (Deutsche Post, 2001, point 10. and 36.). Thus full market opening 
has eliminated the possibility of cross-financing starting from the reserved 
services, however, the possibility of predatory pricing still exists. Thus the 
Notice of the Commission found it necessary to differentiate between 
below-cost selling and anti-competitive rebates. 
The Commission considers it below-cost selling, if the dominant 
undertaking suffers an avoidable loss. For the calculation of this, the 
                                                          
13 Reserved services could have been provided only by the universal service provider, until 
the full market opening. This allowed a statutory monopoly for the universal service 
provider to cover its possible additional burdens. 
 Commission has introduced the use of average avoidable cost (AAC).14 “If 
a dominant undertaking charges a price below AAC for all or part of its 
output, it is not recovering the costs that could have been avoided by not 
producing that output: it is incurring a loss that could have been avoided. 
Pricing below AAC will thus in most cases be viewed by the Commission 
as a clear indication of sacrifice” (Communication from the Commission, 
2009, Section 64). The Commission also declared that the average 
avoidable cost and the average variable costs are the same. If, however, 
they are different, then the average avoidable cost is the better choice, since 
it includes the possible costs of capacity expansion. 
The Communication clearly intended to take into account the elements of 
strategic conduct at below-cost selling. With this attitude, it took a step in 
the debates around predatory pricing towards the approach building on 
modern economic principles, on the importance of the conduct-analysis of 
market actors, and on game theory. “In order to show a predatory strategy, 
the Commission may also investigate whether the allegedly predatory 
conduct led in the short term to net revenues lower than could have been 
expected from a reasonable alternative conduct, that is to say, whether the 
dominant undertaking incurred a loss that it could have avoided. (...) Only 
economically rational and practicable alternatives will be considered which, 
taking into account the market conditions and business realities facing the 
dominant undertaking, can realistically be expected to be more profitable.” 
(Communication, 2009, Section 65). The evidence proving this may be 
found – among others – in the documents of the undertaking. 
                                                          
14 The average avoidable cost contains all costs that are avoidable, if the production 
of a certain product or certain conduct (e.g. market entry) do not happen.  
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In case of anti-competitive market foreclosure the competitors exit from the 
market is not necessary. The Communication [2009] considered the 
weakening of a strong competition or the following of the prices of the 
dominant undertaking as having a market foreclosing effect. The consumers 
are likely to suffer harm, if the dominant company can expect that after 
ending the predatory behaviour its market power will increase. Then not 
only a price increase may happen, but also it is sufficient if the dominant 
company is able to impede or delay an expected price decrease. 
“Identifying consumer harm is not a mechanical calculation of profits and 
losses, and proof of overall profits is not required. Likely consumer harm 
may be demonstrated by assessing the likely foreclosure effect of the 
conduct, combined with consideration of other factors, such as entry 
barriers” (Communication, 2009, Section 71). 
Among the cases of predatory pricing, many refer to the 2012 Post 
Danmark case of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice as a 
landmark decision. 15  In 2004, the Danish incumbent service provider 
gained three major consumers from its largest competitor (Forbruger-
Kontack) in the distribution of unaddressed mail by using a lower price 
compared to the ones used with prior consumers. The price offered to one 
of the major consumers, the Coop group, did not allow Post Danmark to 
cover its average total costs, it did allow it to cover its average incremental 
costs. The competitor submitted a complaint to the competition authority, 
then the case landed at the Danish Supreme Court, which referred it to the 
European Court of Justice for preliminary ruling. 
                                                          
15 We describe the case based Geradin–Malamataris [2014], and Szentléleky [2013]. 
 The European Court of Justice found both predatory pricing and above-cost 
selectively low prices among the anti-competitive pricing options. For 
predatory pricing the European Court of Justice applied the test established 
in the AKZO case (1991). A pricing practice that is above the average 
variable cost but below the average total cost is abusive, insofar as its 
purpose is to drive out a competitor. When calculating the costs, instead of 
using the average variable cost, the average incremental cost was applied 
just as in the Deutsche Post case. This approach was also supported by the 
European Court of Justice, since in the case of network services the use of 
average variable cost may be misleading due to the commonly high fixed 
costs and the low variable costs. 
The cost-calculation was carried out by the Danish competition authority, 
which – as opposed to the Deutsche Post case that used only the fixed and 
variable costs connected to the service, when estimating the average 
variable costs – included the common variable costs, the common costs of 
logistical capacity and some of the non-attributable common costs. 
Consequently, the larger part of the costs ended up being below the average 
incremental costs, which could have been calculated using the Deutsche 
Post methodology. The European Court of Justice did not deal with the 
specifics of the cost-calculation, it only noted that such a method of 
attribution seeks to identify the great bulk of the costs attributable to the 
activity (Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, Section 
34, see http://curia.europa.eu). 
According to a preliminary ruling provided to the Danish Supreme Court, if 
the price contains the great bulk of the costs, then the competitive position 
of the market actors similarly efficient as the dominant undertaking is not 
worse. In the case of a price below the average total cost, but above the 
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average incremental cost only the detailed analysis of the companies' 
conduct could ascertain the exclusion.16 The European Court of Justice also 
noted in relation to the case that the competitor of Post Danmark managed 
to maintain its distribution network, and then it was able to win back the 
Spar group, which also speaks against the exclusionary abuse (Case C-
209/10 Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, Section 39). 
The European Court of Justice also dealt with the question of above-costs 
selectively low prices (from a different perspective: selective price 
reductions), since Post Danmark offered to two out of the three companies 
prices above the average total prices. Even though in two prior cases (Case 
C-395-396 Compagnie maritime belge, Case C-497/99 Irish Sugar, 
http://curia. europa.eu) the Court has reached decisions to consider the 
regular and selectively applied price reduction above the average total costs 
as aiming at the deterrence and exclusion of competitors, in this case this 
was not upheld, and the opinion of the Advocate General also emphasised 
the specific circumstances of the two cases.17 
                                                          
16 “In order to assess the existence of anti-competitive effects in circumstances such as 
those of that case, it is necessary to consider whether that pricing policy, without objective 
justification, produces an actual or likely exclusionary effect, to the detriment of 
competition and, thereby, of consumers’ interests” (Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v. 
Konkurrencerådet, Ruling, see http://curia.europa.eu). 
17 It seems to me that the Court’s case-law must be interpreted as meaning that, where the 
(relatively exceptional) conditions of the Compagnie maritime belge transports and Irish 
Sugar cases are not fulfilled, and in particular where no intention on the part of the 
dominant undertaking to drive out a competitor or competitors can be inferred from the 
circumstances other than offers of selective prices, a selective price reduction must be 
examined by reference to the costs of the dominant undertaking, following the example of 
 The refusal of supply 
The 2009 Communication of the Commission assumed that all companies – 
irrespective of dominance – have the right to choose their trading partners. 
However, service providers that operate in a vertical chain, which often 
possess such infrastructural elements that are crucial also for other 
companies, can easily abuse their dominant position. “Typically 
competition problems arise when the dominant undertaking competes on 
the ‘downstream’ market with the buyer whom it refuses to supply. The 
term ‘downstream market’ is used to refer to the market for which the 
refused input is needed in order to manufacture a product or provide a 
service” (Communication, 2009, Section 76). 
The application of the definition of essential facility provides the 
competitors with the right to access such assets that use would not be at 
their disposal otherwise (Valentiny–Kiss, 2009). The essential facilities are 
part of a vertical supply chain, and their use makes it possible to provide the 
next phase of the supply chain. The application of this term goes together 
with the restriction of right to the freedom of contracting and the freedom to 
dispose over property. Naturally, under certain circumstances these rights 
may be restricted in other cases, however, the question remains whether 
such conditions exist in case of the essential facilities. Some claim that the 
hindrance of use of these assets is merely the case of an unreasonable 
refusal to deal and do not need an independent legal formula. 
One of the most debated questions of postal services is the problem of 
access. The third postal directive stated that postal service providers must 
                                                                                                                                                  
the criterion used in paragraphs 114 and 115 of Akzo v Commission. (Opinion of Advocate 
General Paolo Mengozzi, C-209/10 case, Section 95, see http://curia.europa.eu) 
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have access to the postal network under conditions which are transparent 
and non-discriminatory. The transparent, non-discriminatory access 
conditions are separately mandated to certain elements of postal 
infrastructure or services. This means the access to such elements and 
services like the postcode system, address database, post office boxes, 
delivery boxes, information on change of address, re-direction service and 
return to sender service (2008/6/EC Article 11 and 11a). 
The Directive – just like other EU legal instruments usually do – does not 
determine the legal basis for identifying the access to these certain 
elements. For postal services the point of reference and example is always 
the telecommunications sector. On the wholesale market of 
telecommunications, falling under ex ante regulation, the regulators always 
prescribe obligation of access. 
The first aid to this was contained in the Notice on the application of the 
competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector 
published at the beginning of the market liberalisation of 
telecommunications. Section 68 of this stated that “the expression essential 
facility is used to describe a facility or infrastructure which is essential for 
reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, 
and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable means” (Notice, 1998a 
Section 68). Naturally, the telecommunications analogy is only applicable 
with certain limitations. The postal network does not represent such a 
physical network like telecommunications networks. The postal network 
means mostly an organisational system connecting physical elements, in 
which logistical structures play a crucial role. 
Based on the Communication, it seems that the Commission regards the 
question of access to the essential facilities as a case of the refusal of 
 supply. “The concept of refusal to supply covers a broad range of practices, 
such as a refusal to supply products to existing or new customers, refusal to 
license intellectual property rights, including when the licence is necessary 
to provide interface information, or refusal to grant access to an essential 
facility or a network” (Communication, 2009, Section 78). 
The Communication also states that the refusal of supply does not require 
that the refused product to have already been traded. It is sufficient, if there 
are potential buyers and thus a potential demand exists for the planned 
service. For this reason, an actual refusal is not necessary either, a 
“constructive refusal” is sufficient. “Constructive refusal could, for 
example, take the form of unduly delaying or otherwise degrading the 
supply of the product or involve the imposition of unreasonable conditions 
in return for the supply” (Communication, 2009, Section 79). 
It was due to constructive refusal that the Commission condemned the 
Deutsche Post in another 2001 case. Letters coming from the United 
Kingdom with a German reply address were considered to be domestic mail 
by the Deutsche Post, who then intercepted these and delivered them with 
delays, only after additional tariffs were paid. The Commission condemned 
the Deutsche post for unlawful discrimination, excessive pricing, 
limitations of market and constructive refusal.18 
Based on Section 81 of the Communication, authorities are obliged to take 
action against such conduct that raises the suspicion of restriction of 
competition, if they become aware of the refusal of such a service that is 
objectively necessary, the refusal of which is likely to lead to the 
elimination of effective competition and to consumer harm. However, the 
                                                          
18 Commission Decision on Deutsche Post, IP/01/1068. 
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Communication also made a crucial statement regarding postal (and 
network) services, when it held that imposing an obligation to supply 
cannot have negative effects on the obliged service provider's investments 
and innovations. When imposing an obligation, nevertheless, it can be 
assumed that the incentives of innovation have already been taken into 
account by the authorities when introducing such an obligation to supply. 
“This could also be the case where the upstream market position of the 
dominant undertaking has been developed under the protection of special or 
exclusive rights or has been financed by state resources. In such specific 
cases there is no reason for the Commission to deviate from its general 
enforcement standard of showing likely anticompetitive foreclosure, 
without considering whether the three circumstances referred to in 
paragraph 81 are present” (Communication, 2009, Section 82). 
Margin squeeze 
While predatory pricing may in theory be carried out in a wide range of 
sectors, the question of margin squeeze is analysed rather in regulated 
sectors, because these are mostly ruled by vertically integrated companies. 
These companies are present on the wholesale market (as the basic input 
provider) and on the retail markets at the same time. A vertically integrated 
company is able to induce such price movements in two markets (the 
wholesale and the retail market) that may be restrictive of competition. For 
example it raises the prices of the fundamental inputs and decrease the retail 
consumer prices. The aim of such price changes is to squeeze the margin 
between the costs and selling prices of the competitors (thus the name 
margin squeeze), and consequently forcing the efficient competitors out of 
the market. Given that this happens, the vertically integrated company 
raises consumer prices and by this regains its losses and acquires additional 
 profits. It is apparent that margin squeeze may be considered to be one 
version of predatory pricing. However, margin squeeze may also be handled 
as a business strategy chosen instead of refusal of supply.19 This strategy 
can gain a momentum at the market opening of postal services, since by this 
conduct the vertically integrated incumbent companies can – at least 
temporarily – hinder the competitors on the downstream market, provided 
that they are unable to refuse access. 
The 2009 Communication of the Commission emphasised the impact-based 
approach of the cases. The dominant company may choose to disable an 
equally efficient competitor from trading profitably in long term by setting 
prices, thus applying margin squeeze. “In margin squeeze cases the 
benchmark which the Commission will generally rely on to determine the 
costs of an equally efficient competitor are the LRAIC of the downstream 
division of the integrated dominant undertaking” (Communication, 2009, 
Section 80). 
Among the national regulatory authorities, the German competition 
authority initiated an investigation against Deutsche Post in November 
2012. The suspicion of predatory pricing and margin squeeze was raised 
based on the complaints of independent competitors providing mail service. 
Price reductions 
Price reductions are one of the most common forms of business practice, 
because by increasing the amount of products sold, an improvement in 
efficiency can be achieved, economies of scale can be exploited, the return 
                                                          
19 The fact that the literature is oscillate on the question whether margin squeeze 
belongs to the realms of competition or sectoral regulation shows the two -sidedness 
of the classification of margin squeeze. This is analysed in detail by the articles of  
Heimler [2010] and Geradin– O’Donoghue [2005]. 
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of fixed costs is faster, but it is also able to foreclose the market. The 
Commission evaluated the conduct of Deutsche Post to be such.20 In this 
case the Commission found that the whole system of price reductions 
applied by Deutsche Post was anti-competitive. Between 1974 and 2000 
Deutsche Post applied a rebate system, in which a special price was granted 
to customers for mail-order parcel services in exchange for requiring the 
customer to also send most of their non-bulk parcels via Deutsche Post. 
This system of rebates based on loyalty hindered the competitors from 
reaching the minimum necessary size to function. Without carrying out an 
economic analysis, the Commission held that such a rebate is not linked to 
quantity, but rather to loyalty, and as such it is an anti-competitive effect 
(Deutsche Post, 2001, Section 33).21 
The rejection of loyalty rebates without any consideration has raised 
aversion both in legal and economic circles. Influenced by these, the 
Communication of 2009 has already recommended the use of the tools of 
economic analysis for deciding such cases. By this time the Commission 
has recommended the comparison of average avoidable cost (AAC) and 
long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) for all price-based restrictions 
of competition. If the applied price is below the average avoidable cost, it 
means that the dominant company sacrifices its profits in the short term, 
and the equally efficient competitors is unable to stay on the market without 
producing losses. The long-run average incremental cost is usually higher 
than the average avoidable cost, thus the “failure to cover LRAIC indicates 
that the dominant undertaking is not recovering all the (attributable) fixed 
                                                          
20 The case is more exhaustively analysed by Geradin–Henry [2010], p. 63. 
21 Deutsche Post [2001], Section 33. 
 costs of producing the good or service in question and that an equally 
efficient competitor could be foreclosed from the market” (Communication, 
2009, Section 26). 
Anti-competitive rebates are discussed in the Commission’s 
Communication under exclusive dealing arrangements. The suspicion of 
restriction of competition is raised primarily in the case of conditional 
rebates, when the rebate is provided in exchange for a particular form of 
purchasing behaviour,22 and the seller (service provider) is in a dominant 
position. It is possible that competitors are not able to compete on equal 
terms for the entire demand of each individual customer, thus the 
Communication divides the demand of customers into a contestable and a 
non-contestable portion. This latter is the part the customer necessarily buys 
from the dominant service provider. By applying retroactive rebates, the 
foreclosure of the market is possible, because customers would not tend to 
switch a smaller portion of their demand elsewhere, if this threatened the 
loss of the rebate. The higher the rebate as a percentage of the total price 
and the higher the threshold, the stronger is the likelihood of foreclosure of 
actual or potential competitors. For this reason, the Commission evaluates 
the whole system of rebates, and analyses whether the competitors have any 
realistic and effective counterstrategies, and if so to what extent. Relying 
also on the Communication, national authorities conducted investigations in 
                                                          
22 The usual nature of a conditional rebate is that the customer is given a rebate if its 
purchases over a defined reference period exceed a certain threshold, the rebate being 
granted either on all purchases (retroactive rebates) or only on those made in excess of 
those required to achieve the threshold (incremental rebates) (Communication, 2009, 
Section 37). 
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9 price reduction cases between 2009 and 2013, out of which 3 also 
analysed the question of conditional rebates (WIK, 2013, pp. 68–70). 
State aid 
In the field of postal services it is extremely important that market actors, 
especially incumbent service providers, shall not gain undue advantages, 
but also do not suffer unfair disadvantages as compared to their 
competitors. To achieve this, state aid policy has a crucial role. Between 
2010 and 2013 the Commission dealt with 19 cases, out of which it found 
in 14 that the state aid was appropriate, in two it mandated repayment, in 
another two it held that the paid compensation cannot be considered state 
aid, while in one the state measure was withdrawn (WIK, 2013, pp. 79–80). 
Based on EU law, the Commission first determines whether the 
compensation provided to the services of general economic interest (SGEI) 
could be considered state aid, and if so, in the second step it decides 
whether it is in line with the internal market rules of the EU. In determining 
the first question, the four conditions mentioned in the Altmark case shall 
be applied. (See footnote 8.) 
In the De Post–La Poste- (now bpost), the La Poste- and the Post Office 
Ltd. cases23 the Commission investigated the retail postal networks of the 
Belgian, French and British markets. In these cases the Member States 
submitted model calculations, showing a comparison between the costs of 
their existing delivery network with the costs of a hypothetical network 
without public service obligations. The difference between the two 
provided for the net cost, which emerges due to the obligation. In the De 
Post–La Poste case the Belgian state argued that the actual delivery network 
                                                          
23 See the three cases in Geradin–Malamataris [2014], pp. 122–124. 
 is needed to comply with Belgian national law (for the density of service 
branches), thus the compensation right. However, the Commission did not 
accept this explanation, because the maintenance of the existing network 
was not included in the obligation as an independent condition, but it was 
only related to providing the universal service under sufficient quality 
requirements, thus a claim for state aid was not warranted. 
In the French La Poste case, nevertheless, the Commission accepted that the 
statute differentiated between the access points ensured under the universal 
service obligation and the network ensuring geographically determined 
presence that is listed under the additional obligations, so that this latter was 
allowed to be accounted for as an obligation. Similarly, the British statutory 
provisions made a differentiation between the network necessary to 
conform to the universal service requirements and the retail network that is 
obligatory for services of general economic interest, thus making its 
subsidisation possible. 
While the Commission approved the compensation granted for a wide range 
of public services (handling of social benefit payments, passport and 
vehicle license applications, public utility payment facilities, access to 
postal services and basic bank and cash facilities) of the British Post Office 
in March 2015 (Press Release, IP/15/4635). The Commission conducted an 
investigation based on the first point of the Altmark case. 
The France v. European Commission case (Case T-154/10), in which the 
last decision was published on 3 April 2014,24 was a case on the role of 
state intervention. France objected to the Commission's decision to consider 
                                                          
24 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber) of 3 April 2014 in the C-559/12. P. case 
between the French Republic v. European Commission. 
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state guarantees granted to the postal service to be state aid, thus contested 
the decision at the European Court of Justice. The European Court of 
Justice rejected the French arguments. In the French administrative system, 
the La Poste is an establishment of an industrial and commercial character 
(établissements publics à caractère industriel et commercial – EPIC), which 
is financially independent and as a legal person responsible for the 
performance of a certain public services task. The Commission found that 
the insolvency and bankruptcy laws are inapplicable for EPICs, especially 
since an Act of 1990 on the division of postal and telecommunications 
services granted an unconditional state guarantee for bonds and saving 
bonds of La Poste, which can be considered a state aid. This unconditional 
state guarantee created much better credit terms for La Poste, for which the 
Commission did not even have to prove the actual effects, 25  but the 
unconditional guarantee had to be withdrawn. 
In the case of the Italian postal service (Poste Italiane) the state subsidised 
the tariff decrease of certain consumer groups (publishers, non-profit 
organisations, candidates of elections) along with a universal service 
obligation (Eccles, 2014, pp. 180–181). Originally (between 2009 and 
2012) the Commission was not notified of the compensation by the Italian 
state. The aim of the reduced tariffs was to sustain pluralism, and the 
difference between the reduced and normal tariffs were reimbursed to the 
postal service not by the finance ministry, but by an independent authority. 
                                                          
25  “... simple presumption exists that the grant of an implied and unlimited State 
guarantee in favour of an undertaking which is not subject to the ordinary compulsory 
administration and winding-up procedures results in an improvement in its financial 
position through a reduction of charges which would normally encumber its budget” 
(French Republic v. European Commission, 2014, Section 98). 
 The Italian party assumed that – based on the Altmark case – the 
compensation could not be considered a state aid. However, the 
Commission held that the parameters underlying the compensation were 
only determined long after the start of payments, thus the second condition 
of the Altmark test was not fulfilled. The Italian postal service was also 
unable to sufficiently prove that the costs in all investigated cost-categories 
was in line with market tendencies, thus with the efficiently functioning 
typical company of the sector. Consequently, the fourth condition of the 
Altmark test was also not fulfilled, and the compensation had to be 
considered a state aid. 
In this case the European Union framework for State aid in the form of 
public service compensation (Communication, 2012) had to be applied. In 
this regard, the duration of the public service obligation, the accounting 
division of trade and public service activities, the relation of costs and 
compensation were assessed. Based on all this, the Commission concluded 
that an excessive state aid could not be detected in relation to the universal 
service obligations and reduced tariffs of Italian postal service, thus it is not 
in violation of the requirements of state aid. 
The question of pension funds also belongs to the realm of state aid. In 
many Member States – based on their prior monopoly position – the 
incumbent service providers have accumulated huge pension funds. This 
was considered to be a structural disadvantage compared to the private 
sector in many Member States, and for balancing it measures of pension 
fund compensation were introduced. The cases of the De Post–La Poste, the 
Deutsche Post and the Royal Mail Group of the Commission were such 
disputes (Geradin–Malamataris, 2014, pp. 125–126). The Commission 
presumed that the costs due to the labour laws and collective agreements 
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signed with trade unions are part of the expenditures of the normal course 
of trade, which should be borne by the businesses themselves. Nevertheless, 
the financing of pension fund compensations are carried out from state 
resources, they are selective and able to distort competition, and thus they 
shall be considered state aid. 
The beneficiary of state aid has to prove that the measure (1) truly serves 
the public interest, (2) is necessary to achieve the goal, (3) is proportional. 
Regarding the first condition, the Commission held that such a market 
opening serves the public interest, which aims at creating equal conditions 
for all market participants, thus it is correct to release the incumbents from 
the past burdens of pension funds and all actors shall pay only social 
security equally. Regarding the second condition the Commission 
concluded that the state has previously not provided sufficient resources for 
the long term sustainment of pension funds, so the related financial 
measures are necessary for the sustainment of the funds. At assessing the 
third condition, the social security obligations that have evolved in the 
postal service sector were compared, considering the public servant status 
of the incumbents. 
In practice, the three conditions were applied with flexibility. In the case of 
the German postal service, the Commission found some part of the 
compensation related to the pension funds unacceptable, because the postal 
service used a part of the stamp price increase for the funds, and this was 
found to be an unlawful state aid. In the De Post-La Poste case, the 
situations of the public servants and the contractual employees working for 
the incumbent were compared, and the amount of the compensation was 
found to be satisfactory. In Great-Britain, where it is common that major 
companies maintain pension funds, the basis of the comparison were these 
 companies, and the amount of the compensation was found to be lawful by 
the Commission. 
Mergers 
Mergers fundamentally influence the competitive circumstances of postal 
services, thus assessing the expected change of the competitive situation is 
a basic requirement for reviewing mergers. The rejection decision of the 
Commission in the case of the merger of UPS and TNT has been the third 
merger prohibition in the last decade.26 If the two companies had merged, a 
significant decrease of competition would have occurred on the 
international market of express small package delivery in the European 
Economic Area. Only DHL and FedEx function in a similar integrator role 
on the markets, but the market share of FedEx is lower and in some 
countries it was not present on the market. The national postal services do 
not possess such an extensive air fleet and integrated road transport 
network, which could allow them to manage the service. The Commission 
held that by the merger the number of integrators would decrease from 
three to two in 15 Member States, while the barriers against market entry 
are high. 
The arguments regarding efficiency advantages raised by the parties 
intending the merger were rejected by the Commission, stating that such 
advantages would be lost as a result of the price rises due to the softening 
competition. The Commission also rejected the commitments offered by the 
parties. They offered that in 15 Member States TNT would sell its 
subsidiaries, but this was rejected by the Commission, because very few 
                                                          
26 Case T-194/13, United Parcel Service v. Commission, for a more detailed description of 
mergers, see Eccles [2014]. 
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integrated companies had shown any interest towards them, and only such 
an offer would have been acceptable, which would entail a business 
strategy sustainable in the European Economic Area and would be able to 
expand. Since such offer was not made, the Commission prohibited the 
merger. 
In the merger case of La Poste and Swiss Post,27 the two companies decided 
to create a joint venture. The Commission had reservations regarding the 
original plan, because it would have resulted in the weakening of 
competition on the French market, and the strengthening of the dominant 
position of La Poste was assumed. The aim of the joint venture was to bring 
together the international mail market activities of the two companies. In 
the otherwise shrinking market a dynamic actor would have been 
diminished by the merger on the French market, and a newly entering 
undertaking was also not to be expected. In order to calm the Commission's 
concerns, the Swiss postal service offered that it would sell its French 
subsidiary to a third party. The parties also agreed that the Swiss postal 
office would share the information regarding its consumer contact network, 
and for a limited period it would allow access to its existing multilateral 
international agreements, additionally to allowing the temporary use of its 
established brands. Finally, the Commission approved the creation of a joint 
venture under these conditions. 
Competition law decisions regarding the Hungarian postal services  
So far in the national practice, competition authority resolutions – and in 
some cases judicial decisions – have been adopted in cases of merger, abuse 
of dominant position and restriction of competition. Out of the nine cases 
                                                          
27 Case No. COMP/M.6503 – La Poste/Swiss Post/JV. 
 that we will cover four deal with mergers. The Hungarian competition 
authority has approved all these merger cases, and in one case (Vj-
45/2002/17 http://gvh.hu/dontesek/versenyhivatali_dontesek), it held that 
the submitted application could not be considered a reviewable merger. In 
two cases out of the nine, the competition authority found an abuse of 
dominant position (Vj-167/2001/52) and restriction of competition (Vj-
140/2006/69). 
The facts of the abuse of dominant position were regarding price 
reductions. The board of the competition authority held that the Hungarian 
postal service (Magyar Posta) abused its dominant position by providing 
higher rebates off its mail delivery prices, only in the case of using the 
services of its electronic centre. In its contracts between 1999 and 2001, the 
Hungarian postal service offered rebates higher than the average for 
customers, who had the postal service prepare their mail (usually invoices). 
The restriction of competition was held in the case of Magyar Posta Zrt. and 
Magyar Lapterjesztő Zrt. According to the decision of the board of the 
competition authority, the parties have entered into an agreement restrictive 
of competition, under which the Magyar Posta would not have dealt with 
wholesale newspaper distribution between December 2001 to 31 December 
2007, while the Magyar Lapterjesztő Zrt. would not have intruded into the 
prescription-based newspaper distribution of the Magyar Posta between 
January 2003 and 31 December 2007. The excessive amount of the fine was 
reduced by the appeal court, but it was reversed and upheld by the Supreme 
Court (Versenytükör, 2010, p. 9). 
One of the features of the national competition law decisions related to 
postal services is that the question of newspaper distribution has come up in 
a relatively large number of cases (restriction of competition, merger), also 
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the problem of the legal status of state owned companies has been raised on 
numerous occasions. The board of the competition authority concluded in 
the merger case regarding the Magyar Posta gaining control over the 
Postabank (Post Bank) that when the governmental orders provided the 
Magyar Posta with control power over the Postabank, the governing 
structure of the two state-owned companies was restructured. The 
modification of the governance structure happened between two companies 
that are controlled by the state and are not independent. Consequently, the 
acquisition of control of Magyar Posta over Postabank occurred not 
between independent undertakings, thus it could not be considered a merger 
under competition law (Vj-45/2002/17), and it could not be reviewed. 
In the case Vj/017-036/2012, the board of the competition authority 
authorised the Magyar Posta Zrt. the Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt. 
(Hungarian Electricity Inc., MVM) and the MFB Invest Befektetési és 
Vagyonkezelő Zrt. (Investment corporation of the Hungarian Development 
Bank) to create – under their joint control – the MPVI Mobil Zrt. Firstly, it 
investigated whether the MFB Invest and the Magyar Posta and/or the 
MVM belong to separate governance centres, even though in the end all 
three companies belong to the control powers of a ministry (the MFB Invest 
through the MFB itself, while the Magyar Posta and the MVM through the 
Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő – MNV, Hungarian National Asset 
Management Inc.). Since the MFB Invest is under the control of the MFB, 
the question was rather if the MFB is an independent governance centre of 
its own. “In case of the MFB Inc. the control powers of the minister are 
limited: the approval of the business plans (as the most important element 
of the independent decision-making power) belongs to the MFB Inc., and 
cannot be conducted by the minister. Considering all this, the board of the 
 competition authority held that the MFB Inc. constituted an independent 
governance centre, thus necessarily independent from the Magyar Posta and 
the MVM” (Vj/017-036/2012, Section 31). The acknowledgement of 
independence in this case meant the necessary condition to authorise the 
merger, since under the statute on competition it is sufficient, if there are at 
least two independent undertakings among the founders, thus the board of 
the competition authority “found it unnecessary to investigate whether the 
MNV is independent of the minister, respectively also to his right to give 
orders; and whether the Magyar Posta and the MVM have independent 
decision-making authority” (Vj/017-036/2012, Section 33). 
Concluding remarks 
We have provided an overview of the problems arising in the regulatory 
framework of the third postal directive, the controversies between the postal 
regulation and other regulatory fields. Then we gave an account of the most 
common restrictions of competition in postal services, the questions of state 
aid and mergers, and we described the main characteristics of the 
Hungarian competition law cases. 
It may be apparent from the development of the regulatory environment 
that the directive, by providing flexibility in price-setting, promoted the 
predominance of competition law, especially considering that the tests for 
assessing certain questions (e.g. the test for margin squeeze) had been 
established first in competition law – among others by applying them to 
postal services. However, the third directive enabled that the universal 
service providers, who are not designated but provide services that 
constitute universal service activity, could be imposed with requirements of 
quality, availability and performance of the relevant services. The content 
of the licences issued in relation, along with the scope of service 
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requirements and the question of possible financial contribution to comply 
with the universal service are all dependent on regulatory intervention. In 
some questions – for example in relation to universal service (regarding the 
principle of calculating net costs) – it can be detected that the European 
Regulators Group for Postal Services may provide more and more 
assistance to the national regulatory authorities. 
The completion of market opening in network services proved that the role 
of competition rules increase following a full market opening. The new 
entrants into the market attempt to avert the market-protection steps of the 
incumbent service providers by using the prohibition on restrictions of 
competition. By providing exclusive authority to regulate competition to the 
sectoral regulatory authorities, the chance of the capture of the authority – 
well-known in the literature – would increase. The harmonisation of the 
competition regulation and the sectoral regulation is needed in the field of 
postal services, for which the regulation of state aid could serve as an 
example. Cost-calculations are mostly supervised by the national regulatory 
authorities, and when the four conditions established by the Altmark case 
are not fulfilled, the compensation may constitute a state aid that must be 
examined by the Commission. If the compensation is too high, the aid may 
be considered illegal. For this reason, the coordination between regulatory 
and competition authorities is crucial, since in course of the regulation both 
the financial balance of the designated universal service providers and the 
realisation of profits from the increased competition must be ensured. Due 
to this, the third postal directive has limited the intervention competence of 
the sectoral regulators to the level necessary for ensuring universal service, 
however, at the same time it provided greater decisional authority in this 
realm. 
 The directive requires cost-orientation, transparency and non-discrimination 
in terms of prices. The national regulatory authorities so far have not 
ensured that the terminal dues of universal services reflect these principles. 
The terminal dues determined by UPU do not correspond with either the 
actual cost, or the national postal price-determinations. Such a 
determination of terminal dues in the EU legal system is close to being 
price-fixing as a conduct restricting competition, and the incumbents 
applying these may be accused of abuse of a dominant position. 
In this situation, it seems that some Member States and authorities alone are 
not enough to enforce the EU directives, so a more active role would be 
needed from the EU institutions. Similarly, in the next rounds of the 
negotiations of international trade agreements a more united EU approach is 
called for. 
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